Welfare Changes and Sectoral Adjustments of Asia-Pacific Countries under Alternative Sequencings of Free Trade Agreements by Itakura, Ken & Hiro Lee
 
OSIPP Discussion Paper: DP-2012-E-005
    
 
Welfare Changes and Sectoral Adjustments of Asia-Pacific Countries 
under Alternative Sequencings of Free Trade Agreements* 
 
March 30, 2012 
 
Ken Itakura 
Graduate School of Economics, Nagoya City University 
Hiro Lee† 
Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University 
 
 Keywords:  Sequencing, FTA, Asia-Pacific, CGE model 
 JEL codes:  F15, F17 
 Abstract:  In this paper we compare welfare effects and the extent of sectoral adjustments of 
the member countries under alternative free trade agreement (FTA) sequencings in the 
Asia-Pacific region using a dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. If a 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement under one sequencing and an East Asian FTA 
(EAFTA) under another sequencing will enter into force at the same time, followed by more 
enlarged FTAs, then a larger number of countries are expected to realize greater welfare gains 
under the Asia-track sequencing. However, given the uncertainty about the establishment of an 
Asia-wide FTA in the near future, the TPP-track sequencing appears to be an attractive option 
for most countries in the Asia-Pacific region. With respect to sectoral adjustments, there seem 
to be no significant differences among the alternative sequencings considered in this study. 
 
                                                 
* We would like to thank Winston W. Chang and participants at the International Conference on the 
Global Economy, Seattle, 17-18 March 2012 for helpful comments on an earlier version. We gratefully 
acknowledge financial support from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science program, 
Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B) No. 22330084. 
† Corresponding author. Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University, 1-31 Machi- 
kaneyama, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043, Japan. Email: hlee@osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp.  
1.  Introduction  
In the past decade, a growing number of bilateral and plurilateral free-trade 
agreements (FTAs) involving Asia-Pacific countries have been ratified. For example, the 
ASEAN countries have implemented FTAs with six major trading partners in the region – 
China, Japan, Korea, India, and Australia/New Zealand – while they aim to create a single 
market (ASEAN Economic Community) across the 10 member states by 2015. Korea 
became the first country to sign an FTA with the EU under the “Global Europe” initiative, 
and the EU-Korea FTA entered into force in July 2011. In addition, the Korea-US FTA 
entered into effect in March 2012. Furthermore, the creation of an East Asian FTA and a 
Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) has been proposed by leaders of several 
Asia-Pacific countries in recent years. Whether the growth of FTAs has a positive or 
negative impact on multilateral trade liberalization under the WTO has been debated 
intensely (e.g., Krueger, 1999; Panagariya, 2000; Lloyd and MacLaren, 2004). 
A number of studies have quantified the effects of various FTAs in the Asia-Pacific 
region using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model (e.g., Kawai and Wignaraja, 
2008; Lee et al., 2004, 2009; Lee and van der Mensbrugghe, 2008; Park, 2006; Petri et al., 
2011; Urata and Kiyota, 2005). In addition, there have been studies on the sequencing of 
real and monetary integration (e.g., Baldwin, 2008; Kreinin and Plummer, 2009). In 
contrast, studies on industrial adjustments and consequent optimum sequencing of FTAs 
are extremely scarce. Bond (2008) considers the relationship between adjustment costs and 
sequencing of trade liberalization, such as the elimination of tariffs, liberalization of 
financial markets, and adoption of common policies, but not the sequencing of FTAs. 
However, the magnitudes of sectoral output and employment adjustments resulting from 
different FTAs will be a great concern to policy makers. In this paper, we will shed light 
on the relationship between sequencing of FTAs and the extent of industrial adjustments 
for Asia-Pacific countries. 
In this paper, we compare three alternative sequencings of FTAs in the Asia-Pacific 
region, namely (1) TPP9, followed by TPP13 and FTAAP, (2) ASEAN+3 FTA (East Asia 
Free Trade Area: EAFTA), followed by ASEAN+6 FTA (Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership in East Asia: CEPEA) and FTAAP, and (3) same as (2) except that Asia-wide 
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FTAs are delayed several years.1 Using a global dynamic CGE model, we examine which 
scenario might be most advantageous in terms of welfare gains and industrial adjustments. 
This requires three steps. We first establish the baseline scenario for the period up to 2030. 
Second, for each scenario of FTA sequencing, we compute changes in economic welfare 
and the extent of sectoral output adjustments of the member countries relative to the 
baseline. Third, we calculate the rank correlation between the extent of adjustments under 
each FTA sequencing and the extent of adjustments that would prevail under global trade 
liberalization (GTL). If a particular FTA sequencing would change the industrial structure 
within each country closer to that which would prevail under free trade, while increasing 
economic welfare of the member countries, then that FTA sequencing may be considered 
as a facilitating intermediate step towards GTL. 
An overview of the model and data is given in the next section, followed by 
descriptions of the baseline scenario and three FTA sequencing scenarios in section 3. In 
section 4 assessments of welfare effects and sectoral output adjustments under alternative 
FTA sequencings are offered. Concluding remarks are provided in the final section. 
 
2.  Analytical Framework and Data 
2.1  Overview of the Dynamic GTAP Model 
The numerical simulations undertaken for this study are derived from the Dynamic 
GTAP model, described in detail by Ianchovichina and McDougall (2001). This model 
extends the comparative static framework of the standard GTAP model developed by 
Hertel (1997) to the dynamic framework by incorporating international capital mobility 
and capital accumulation. In the standard static GTAP model, capital can move across 
industries within a region, but not across regions or countries. For a long-run analysis to be 
more realistic, the model requires a mechanism to capture incentives to invest in different 
regions, thereby allowing international capital mobility and capital accumulation. 
                                                 
1 The members of TPP9 are Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, United 
States and Vietnam. The members of TPP13 consist of the members of TPP9, plus Canada, Japan, 
Korea and Mexico. 
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The Dynamic GTAP model preserves all the features of the standard GTAP, such 
as constant returns to production technology, perfectly competitive markets, and product 
differentiation by countries of origin, in keeping with the so-called Armington assump-
tion.2 At the same time, it enhances the investment theory by incorporating international 
capital mobility and ownership. In this way it captures important FTA effects on invest-
ment and wealth that are missed by a static model. 
In the Dynamic GTAP model, each of the regions is endowed with fixed physical 
capital stock owned by domestic firms. The physical capital is accumulated over the time 
with new investment. This dynamics is driven by the net investment, which is sourced by 
regional households’ savings. Regional households own indirect claims on the physical 
capital in the form of equity. There are two types of equities: equity in domestic firms and 
equity in foreign firms. The households directly own the domestic equity but only 
indirectly hold the foreign equity. To access equity in foreign firms, the households must 
own shares in a portfolio of foreign equities provided by the “global trust” that is assumed 
to be the sole financial intermediary for all foreign investments. The values of the 
households’ equity holdings in domestic firms and in the global trust evolve over the time, 
and the households allocate all their savings for investment. Collecting such investment 
funds across regions, the global trust reinvests the funds in firms around the world and 
offers a portfolio of equities to households. The sum of households’ equity holdings in the 
global trust is equal to the global trust’s equity holdings in firms around the world. 
The savings in one region are invested directly in domestic firms and indirectly in 
foreign firms through the global trust, which are in turn reinvested in all regions. The 
dynamics arising from positive savings in one region is related to the dynamics from the 
net investment in other regions. Overall, at the global level, it must hold that all the savings 
across regions are completely invested in home and overseas markets. 
                                                 
2 See Armington (1969). The model uses a nested CES structure, where at the top nested level, each 
agent chooses to allocate aggregate demand between domestically produced goods and an aggregate 
import bundle, while minimizing the overall cost of the aggregate demand bundle. At the second level, 
aggregate import demand is allocated across different trading partners, again using a CES specification, 
wherein the aggregate costs of imports are minimized. 
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In theory, incentives for investments or equity holdings are governed by the rates of 
return, which will be equalized across regions if capital is perfectly mobile. However, an 
equalization of the rates of return seems unrealistic, at least in the short run. In addition, 
there exist well-known empirical observations for “home bias” in savings and investment 
and households’ equity holdings. The observations suggest that the capital is not perfectly 
mobile, causing some divergence in the rates of return across regions. The dynamic GTAP 
model allows inter-regional differences in the rates of return in the short run, which will be 
eventually equalized in the very long run. This may be regarded as a realistic approach, but 
it calls for a mechanism to allocate equity holdings of the households and the global trust 
in a way consistent with the observed data. It is assumed that differences in the rates of 
return are attributed to the errors in investors’ expectations about the future rates of return. 
During the process, these errors are gradually adjusted to the actual rate of return as time 
elapses. Eventually the errors are eliminated and a unique rate of return across regions can 
be attained. 
While perfect capital mobility is assumed only in the very long run, investment is 
induced by a gradual movement in the expected rate of return toward an equality across 
regions. The expected rate of return may differ from the actual rate of return due to errors 
in expectations. Explicit modeling of the ownership of regional investment allows one to 
determine the accumulation of wealth by foreigners. In addition, the ownership of 
domestic and foreign assets can also be tracked. Income accruing from the ownership of 
the foreign and domestic assets can then be appropriately incorporated into total regional 
income. 
Participating in an FTA could lead to more investment from abroad. Trade 
liberalization often makes prices of goods in a participating country lower due to removal 
of tariffs, creating an increase in demand for the goods. Responding to the increased 
demand, production of the goods expands in the member country. The expansion of 
production is attained by using more intermediate inputs, labor, capital, and other primary 
factor inputs. These increased demands for production inputs raise the corresponding 
prices, wage rates, and rental rates. Higher rental rates are translated into higher rates of 
return, attracting more investment from both home and foreign countries. 
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 2.2  Data, aggregation, and initial tariffs 
In this study we employ the GTAP version 7.1 database, which has a 2004 base 
year and distinguishes 112 countries/regions and 57 sectors (Narayanan and Walmsley, 
2008). For the purposes of the present study, the data has been aggregated to 22 
countries/regions and 29 sectors, as shown in Table 1. Foreign income data are obtained 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s Balance of Payments Statistics, which are 
used to track international capital mobility and foreign wealth. The values of key 
parameters, such as demand, supply and CES substitution elasticities, are based upon the 
previous empirical estimates. The model calibration primarily consists of calculating share 
and shift parameters to fit the model specifications to the observed data, so as to be able to 
reproduce a solution for the base year.  
The sectoral tariff rates for the 22 countries/regions in 2004 are summarized in 
Table 2. There are striking differences in the tariff structures across the countries/regions. 
Singapore is duty free with the exception of alcohol and tobacco. In Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan, the extraordinarily high tariff rates on rice particularly stand out. The tariff rates in 
a number of other agricultural and food products are also high in these three countries as 
well as in India. With the exception of Australia, New Zealand and Chile, the tariff rates on 
some agricultural and food products are also relatively high in other regions, such as sugar 
in Indonesia, the Philippines, the United States and the EU, meats in Thailand, Canada and 
the rest of the world, and dairy products in the United States and Canada. In manufacturing 
the tariff rates on textiles and apparel are relatively high in all regions except Singapore, 
Chile and the EU. The rates on motor vehicles are quite high in China, Taiwan, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Vietnam, and the rest of ASEAN. 
Ad valorem tariff equivalents of nontariff barriers (NTBs) in eight services sectors 
are computed from the gravity-model estimates of Wang et al. (2009). There are even 
greater variations in tariff equivalents of NTBs in services than in commodities. 
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3.  The Baseline and Policy Scenarios 
3.1  The Baseline Scenario  
In order to evaluate the effects of various sequencing of FTAs, the baseline 
scenario is first established, showing the path of each of the 22 economies/regions over the 
period 2004-2030. The baseline contains information on macroeconomic variables as well 
as expected policy changes. The macroeconomic variables in the baseline include 
projections for real GDP, gross investment, capital stocks, population, skilled and unskilled 
labor, and total labor. Real GDP projections were obtained from IMF’s World Economic 
Outlook Database (September 2011). The data on gross fixed capital formation were 
acquired from IMF’s IFS Online. Projections for population were taken from U.S. Census 
Bureau’s International Data Base, while those for labor were obtained from International 
Labor Organisation (ILO)’s Economically Active Population Estimates and Populations. 
The projections for population, investment, skilled labor and unskilled labor 
obtained for over 150 countries were aggregated, and the growth rates were calculated to 
obtain the macroeconomic shocks describing the baseline. Changes in the capital stocks 
were not imposed exogenously, but were determined endogenously as the accumulation of 
projected investment. Any changes in real GDP not explained by the changes in 
endowments are attributed to technological change. 
In addition, policy projections are also introduced into the baseline. The policies 
included in the baseline are those which are already agreed upon and legally binding, 
including the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the ASEAN-China, ASEAN-Korea, 
ASEAN-Japan, ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand and ASEAN-India FTAs. 
 
3.2  Policy Scenarios 
Welfare and sectoral output effects of alternative sequencing of FTAs are to be 
evaluated in this study. The following three scenarios, as well as the global trade 
liberalization (GTL) scenario, are designed: 
Scenario 1 (TPP-track): EU-Korea FTA, Korea-US FTA, and TPP9 over the period 2013-
2016, TPP13 over the period 2017-2022, and FTAAP over the period 2023-2030. 
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Scenario 2 (Asia-track): EU-Korea FTA, Korea-US FTA, and ASEAN+3 FTA (EAFTA) 
over the period 2013-2016, ASEAN+6 FTA (CEPEA) over the period 2017-2022, and 
FTAAP over the period 2023-2030. 
Scenario 3 (delayed Asia-track): EU-Korea and Korea-US FTAs over the period 2013-
2016, ASEAN+3 FTA (EAFTA) over the period 2017-2020, ASEAN+6 FTA 
(CEPEA) over the period 2021-2025, and FTAAP over the period 2026-2030. 
GTL:  Global trade liberalization over the period 2013-2030. 
 
It is assumed that tariff rates on commodities decline linearly to zero and tariff 
equivalents of NTBs in service are reduced by 25 percent during the periods in 
consideration among the member countries. One can design an infinite number of 
scenarios, but we have chosen to compare among TPP-track, Asia-track, and delayed Asia-
track scenarios to examine which sequencing would be most attractive to Asia-Pacific 
countries. In all three scenarios, the EU-Korea and Korea-US FTAs are assumed to be 
implemented by 2016. TPP9 is followed by TPP13 and FTAAP in Scenario 1, while 
EAFTA is followed by CEPEA and FTAAP in Scenarios 2 and 3. 
Petri et al. (2011) also compare between Asia-track and Trans-Pacific track of 
FTAs. There are, however, three notable differences between their scenarios and ours. First, 
we have a slightly longer time periods (2013-2030 versus 2012-2025) to allow for more 
gradual implementation of region-wide FTAs. Second, they assume that in the Asia-track 
an FTA among China, Japan and Korea is implemented first, followed by EAFTA and 
FTAAP. We assume that a China-Japan-Korea (CJK) FTA is unlikely to be realized 
mainly because there are territorial disputes between China and Japan regarding Senkaku / 
Diaoyutai Islands, and those between Japan and Korea concerning Takeshima / Dokdo 
islets. In addition, China-Korea and China-Japan fisheries disputes in recent years have 
become another source of political tension involving the three countries. It is assumed in 
this paper that an ASEAN+3 FTA is more likely to be realized than a CJK FTA. Finally, 
we consider a scenario in which Asia-wide FTAs are delayed because no time frame has 
been proposed for negotiations of an ASEAN+3 FTA or an ASEAN+6 FTA. 
Three caveats should be borne in mind when interpreting the results presented in 
the next section. First, investment liberalization among the member countries are not 
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considered because it requires the data on foreign direct investment (FDI) flows by source 
and host countries and industry, which are unavailable. A challenging extension of the 
paper would be to endogenize FDI flows to consider attraction of these flows to 
developing member countries, which may have a significant impact, as were the cases of 
Mexico joining NAFTA in 1994 and Spain and Portugal joining the EU in 1986. Second, 
NTBs in manufacturing are not incorporated in this study due to a lack of reliable 
empirical estimates. NTBs also exists in a number of manufacturing sectors, including 
automobiles, pharmaceutical products, and some of food products. In these products 
regulatory and other barriers, such as stringent standards and testing and certification 
procedures, exist. Thus, reductions of NTBs in manufacturing are expected to enlarge the 
benefits of the FTAs. Third, we do not incorporate compliance cost associated with rules 
of origin (ROOs), nor the cost-mitigating effect arising from consolidating FTAs. As 
smaller FTAs are consolidated, the harmful “noodle bowl” effects – caused by different 
FTAs having different ROOs and varying coverage – can be mitigated. The compliance 
cost eventually becomes zero when all countries participate in a trade agreement because 
there will be no ROOs under global trade liberalization (GTL). These issues are left for 
future research. 
 
4.  Empirical Findings 
4.1  Welfare Effects of Alternative Sequencing of FTAs 
Economic welfare is largely determined by four factors: (1) allocative efficiency, 
(2) the terms of trade, (3) the contribution to equivalent variation (EV) of change in the 
price of capital investment goods, and (4) the contribution to EV of change in equity 
owned by a region. The fourth factor is determined by the change in equity income from 
ownership of capital endowments, and it can be further decomposed into three parts: a 
change in the domestic capital stock, a change in household income earned on capital 
abroad, and a change in the domestic capital owned by foreigners. 
With respect to these four factors, the direction of a welfare change may be 
summarized as follows. The allocative efficiency effect is generally positive for members 
of consolidated FTAs such as those examined in this paper. This effect is particularly large 
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for a country with high average initial tariffs. However, it may become negative when the 
extent of trade diversion is considerably large in FTAs with relatively low intraregional 
trade. The terms-of-trade effect is usually positive for the members with low average initial 
tariffs and negative for those with high initial tariffs. An increase in the price of capital 
investment goods generally raises welfare. A welfare change resulting from a change in the 
equity holdings is positive if the sum of the region’s foreign income receipts and an 
increase in the domestic capital stock is greater than the foreign income payment, and vice 
versa. 
The welfare results for the three policy scenarios, as percentage point deviations in 
equivalent variation from the baseline for the years 2020, 2025 and 2030, are summarized 
in Table 3. Under Scenario 1 (TPP-track), the welfare level of all TPP member countries 
increases in 2020-2030, whereas that of all APEC members (regions 1-20 less the rest of 
ASEAN and India) increases in 2025 and 2030. Economic welfare of several nonmember 
regions decreases slightly in 2020 and/or 2025. The welfare gains of TPP13 countries in 
2030 range from 0.8% (United States) to 7.5% (Korea).3 Seven countries, namely Japan, 
Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, Australia and New Zealand, are both ASEAN+6 
and TPP13 members. Other than New Zealand, these countries’ welfare gains in 2020 are 
smaller under the TPP-track than under the Asia-track, which is largely caused by 
substantially smaller trade with TPP members than trade with ASEAN+6 members (see the 
Appendix Table). For example, Vietnam’s exports to TPP13 and ASEAN+6 regions are 
projected to constitute respectively 34.5% and 63.7% of its total exports, while its imports 
from these regions are projected to comprise 36.6% and 73.1% of its total imports in 2013.  
Under Scenario 2 (Asia-track), economic welfare of all ASEAN+6 countries 
increases in 2020-2030, ranging from 1.4% (Japan) to 13.5% (Vietnam) in 2030. 
Vietnam’s large welfare gain is attributable to its high initial tariffs (Table 2), large trade to 
GDP ratio, and high shares of imports from ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6 and APEC countries in 
its total trade, which are projected to be 69%, 73% and 83%, respectively, for the year 
2013 in the baseline, among the highest in East Asia. Other countries with greater than 5% 
projected gains in 2030 include Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, India and Russia. Taiwan is 
                                                 
3 A part of Korea’s large welfare gains is attributable to the EU-Korea and Korea-US FTAs. 
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not a member of the ASEAN+3 or ASEAN+6 grouping, and its welfare is predicted to fall 
by 1.5% in 2020 largely because the shares of its trade with these regions is high (58-62% 
of its total trade) and the extent of trade diversion would be large. Thus, it has strong 
incentive to convince the other APEC members of the benefits of FTAAP, as its welfare is 
projected to increase by 4.5% in 2030 when FTAAP is assumed to be fully implemented. 
The comparison of welfare changes between the two scenarios appears to suggest 
that East Asian economies other than Taiwan would be better off pursuing EAFTA and 
CEPEA rather than following TPP. However, our welfare results for Scenarios 1-2 are 
based on the assumption that EAFTA and TPP9 will start in the same year (2013). While 
TPP9 countries have held eleven rounds of negotiations as of March 2012, no negotiations 
for EAFTA have taken place. Thus, we need to consider the third scenario in which 
implementations of Asia-wide FTAs are delayed. 
In Scenario 3 the implementations of EAFTA and CEPEA are assumed to be 
delayed four years compared with Scenario 2. Welfare changes for India, Australia and 
New Zealand become considerably different, particularly for 2020, because the ASEAN+6 
FTA would not be implemented until 2021 under this scenario. For the ASEAN+3 
members, however, the welfare results for 2020, 2025 and 2030 are rather similar to those 
under Scenario 2. Although not reported in Table 3, those for 2017-2019 are quite different 
between the two scenarios. For example, Japan’s welfare gains for those years are 0.1%, 
0.3% and 0.5% under Scenario 3, compared with 0.8%, 0.8% and 0.9% under Scenario 2. 
While welfare gains are substantially smaller during the delayed period for the ASEAN+3 
members, the differences in welfare changes would taper off for the most members. 
Overall, delays in Asia-wide FTAs would somewhat reduce welfare gains for East Asian 
countries, but still yields larger welfare gains for the region than under the TPP-track. 
The greater overall welfare gains under the Asia-track and delayed Asia-track 
scenarios relative to the TPP-track scenario is largely caused by larger intra-ASEAN+6 
trade than intra-TPP13 trade. If TPP is open to new member countries such as India, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and eventually China in the future, the extent of 
welfare gains is expected to become considerably greater. Given the uncertainty about the 
establishment of an Asia-wide FTA in the near future, an early implementation of TPP 
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appears to be a sensible option for Asia-Pacific counties, provided that sectoral 
adjustments of member countries are relatively smooth. 
 
4.2   Sectoral Output Adjustments and the Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients 
 
Structural adjustments and resource reallocations result from trade policy changes. 
The sequencings of FTAs and differences in the initial tariff rates across sectors play a 
critical role in determining the direction of the adjustments in sectoral output. Other factors 
that affect the magnitude and direction of output adjustments for each product category 
include the import-demand ratio, the export-output ratio, the share of each imported 
intermediate input in total costs, and the elasticity of substitution between domestic and 
imported products.4  
Table 4 presents the Spearman rank correlation coefficients between sectoral 
adjustment rankings in 2020 and 2025, between rakings in 2025 and 2030 for each 
scenario, as well as the Spearman rank correlation coefficients between sectoral adjustment 
in each scenario and GTL for the year 2030. For the economies included in both 
ASEAN+6 and TPP13 groupings, differences in the Spearman rank correlation coefficients 
under the TPP-track and under the Asia-track are quite small except Japan. In Japan output 
adjustments rankings for other transportation, metal and chemical products are among the 
top six sectors under GTL, but these sectors’ rankings move down considerably (to 15th-
24th) under the TPP-track in 2030. A more careful examination is needed to determine 
reasons why the rankings differ significantly between the TPP-track and Asian-track for 
some countries in 2030, when FTAAP is assumed to be fully implemented in both 
scenarios. 
                                                 
4  A sector with a larger import-demand ratio generally suffers from proportionately larger output 
contraction through greater import penetration when initial tariff levels are relatively high. In contrast, a 
sector with a higher export-output ratio typically experiences a larger extent of output expansion, as a 
result of the removal of tariffs in the member countries. The share of imported intermediate inputs in the 
total cost of a downstream industry (e.g., the share of imported textiles in the cost of the apparel 
industry) would evidently affect the magnitude and direction of output adjustments in the latter sector. 
Finally, the greater the values of substitution elasticities between domestic and imported products, the 
greater the sensitivity of the import-domestic demand ratio to changes in the relative price of imports, 
thereby magnifying the effects of FTAs. 
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For the countries that are members of ASEAN+6 but not members of TPP13 (i.e. 
China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, the rest of ASEAN and India), the Spearman 
rank correlation coefficients are greater under Scenario 1 (Asia-track). For the countries 
that are members of TPP13 but not members of ASEAN+6 (i.e. the United States, Canada, 
Mexico, Chile and Peru), the coefficients are generally greater under Scenario 2 (TPP-
track) except for Canada. In 2025, when TPP is fully implemented and FTAAP is partially 
implemented, Canada expands output in such sectors as other gains, meats, other food 
products, machinery and electronic equipment, and contracts output in dairy products, 
textiles, apparel, and many services sectors. When TPP is fully implemented in 2030, 
however, Canada contracts output in meats, machinery and electronic equipment, and 
expands output in many services sectors. This is because Canada has comparative 
advantage in machinery and electronic equipment vis-à-vis other TPP countries but not 
vis-à-vis East Asian countries. Similarly, Canada has comparative advantage in many 
services sectors vis-à-vis East Asian countries except Singapore, but not vis-à-vis other 
TPP countries, particularly the United States. 
Under the Asia-track, output of machinery and electronic equipment increases in 
China, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam and India. For these 
countries, intra-ASEAN+6 trade in machinery and electronic equipment comprise very 
large shares of the total trade in these products. Thus, production networks in these 
products are likely to play an even more important role under region-wide FTAs, further 
bolstering investment and fostering transfer of technology.5 Output of agricultural sectors 
fall significantly in Japan and Korea, while that of motor vehicles increase considerably in 
these countries. Output of textiles and apparel increase substantially in China, Indonesia, 
Thailand and Vietnam, and that of most services sectors increase in Singapore, Australia 
and New Zealand. In the delayed Asia-track scenario, both the direction and magnitudes of 
changes in sectoral output are very similar to those under the Asia-track. 
Under the TPP-track, changes in sectoral output in Japan, Korea, Singapore, 
Malaysia, Vietnam, Australia and New Zealand are relatively similar to those under the 
                                                 
5 Since the Dynamic GTAP model does not incorporate the FDI-productivity effect, an inclusion of 
such effect is left for future research. 
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Asia-track. For China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, the rest of ASEAN and India, 
the magnitudes of changes in sectoral output are significantly smaller under the TPP-track 
in 2020 and 2025. In the United States, output of rice, livestock, meats, other food products, 
petroleum products and all services sectors would expand, while most manufacturing 
sectors are expected to contract.6 
The correlations between sectoral adjustment rankings in 2020 and 2025, as well as 
between rakings in 2025 and 2030, under the TPP-track and Asia-track scenarios are 
generally high, and the two FTA sequencings tend to change the industrial structure within 
each member country closer to that which would prevail under global trade liberalization. 
Neither the TPP-track scenario nor the Asia-track scenario would divert the industrial 
structure of member countries from that which is projected under multilateral free trade. 
Nevertheless, some sectors in several countries, including rice, other grains and meats in 
Japan and Korea, and textiles and apparel in the United States, Australia and New Zealand 
are expected to contract substantially by 2030 if no domestic reforms aimed at increasing 
competitiveness of these sectors are carried out. For nonmember countries, low rank 
correlations are no cause for concern because percentage changes in sectoral output are 
quite small.  
Under the delayed Asia-track scenario, no new FTAs involving India, Australia and 
New Zealand would be implemented until 2021, and no new FTAs for the six APEC 
countries (the United States, Canada, Mexico, Chile, Peru and Russia) would be 
implemented until 2026. Percentage deviations in sectoral output from the baseline would 
be very small until an FTA involving these countries enters into force. Consequently, 
rankings of sectoral output adjustment are rather meaningless for India, Australia and New 
Zealand in 2020 and for the six APEC countries in 2025 and 2030. Thus, the Spearman 
rank correlation coefficients are not provided for these countries when there is no policy 
shock in one of the years. Where the coefficients are provided under Scenario 3 in Table 4, 
they are very similar to those under Scenario 2. 
 
                                                 
6 The sectoral output results are available upon request from the corresponding author. 
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5.  Conclusion  
In this paper, we have used the Dynamic GTAP model to investigate how 
alternative sequencings of FTAs in the Asia-Pacific region might affect the welfare 
changes and sectoral output adjustments. Under the assumption that the TPP9 agreement 
and ASEAN+3 FTA will enter into force in 2013, followed by more enlarged FTAs, more 
member countries are expected to realize larger welfare gains under the Asia-track. 
However, since no time frame has been proposed for negotiations of an ASEAN+3 FTA or 
an ASEAN+6 FTA, the delayed Asia-track scenario is considered. When the creations of 
Asia-wide FTAs are delayed, welfare changes for India, Australia and New Zealand 
become significantly smaller than when there are no delays. Welfare changes for the 
ASEAN+3 countries would be largely affected during the delayed period, but differences 
in welfare gains between the Asia-track and delayed Asia-track scenarios shrink rapidly 
after 2020. 
With respect to sectoral output adjustments, there appear to be no significant 
differences among the TPP-track, Asian-track, and delayed Asia-track sequencings. In the 
first two FTA sequencings, correlations between sectoral adjustment rankings in 2020 and 
2025 and those between rakings in 2025 and 2030 are relatively high, and both FTA 
sequencings would move the industrial structure within each member country closer to that 
which would prevail under global free trade. The relevant rank correlation coefficients 
under the delayed Asia-track sequencing are very similar to those under the Asia-track 
sequencing. 
The Asia-track scenario is preferred to the delayed Asia-track scenario since 
welfare gains are generally larger for the former, whereas there are no significant 
differences in the extent of structural adjustments of the member countries. Between the 
TPP-track and Asia-track scenarios, a larger number of countries is expected to realize 
greater welfare gains under the Asia-track. However, since there is a great deal of 
uncertainty about the creation of a region-wide FTA in Asia, the TPP-track might become 
a desirable option for most countries in the Asia-Pacific region. In particular, since TPP is 
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Table 1: Regional and sectoral aggregation 
 
A. Regional aggregation     
  Country/region Corresponding economies/regions in the GTAP database 
   
 1 Japan Japan 
 2 China China, Hong Kong 
 3 Korea Korea 
 4 Taiwan Taiwan 
 5 Singapore Singapore 
 6 Indonesia Indonesia 
 7 Malaysia Malaysia 
 8 Philippines Philippines 
 9 Thailand Thailand 
 10 Vietnam Vietnam 
 11 Rest of ASEAN Cambodia, Laos, rest of Southeast Asia 
 12 India India 
 13 Australia Australia 
 14 New Zealand New Zealand 
 15 United States United States 
 16 Canada Canada 
 17 Mexico Mexico 
 18 Chile Chile 
 19 Peru Peru 
 20 Russia Russia 
 21 EU-27 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom 






Table 1 (continued) 
 
B. Sectoral aggregation     
  Sector Corresponding commodities/sectors in the GTAP database 
   
 1 Rice Paddy rice, processed rice 
 2 Other grains Wheat, cereal grains nec 
 3 Sugar Sugar, sugar cane and sugar beet 
 4 Other crops Vegetables and fruits, oil seeds, plant-based fibers, crops nec 
 5 Livestock Cattle, sheep and goats, animal products nec, raw milk, wool  
 6 Fossil fuels Coal, oil, gas 
 7 Natural resources Forestry, fishing, minerals nec 
 8 Meats Cattle, sheep, goat, and horse meat products, meat products nec 
 9 Dairy products Dairy products 
 10 Other food products Vegetable oils, food products nec, beverages and tobacco products 
 11 Textiles Textiles 
 12 Apparel Wearing apparel, leather products 
 13 Wood and paper Wood products, paper products, publishing 
 14 Petroleum products Petroleum, coal products 
 15 Chemical products Chemical, rubber, plastic products 
 16 Metal Iron and steel, nonferrous metal, fabricated metal products 
 17 Machinery Machinery and equipment 
 18 Electronic equipment Electronic equipment 
 19 Motor vehicles Motor vehicles and parts 
 20 Other transport equip. Transport equipment nec 
 21 Other manufactures Mineral products nec, manufactures nec 
 22 Construction and utilities Construction, electricity, gas manufacture and distribution, water 
 23 Trade Trade 
 24 Sea transport Sea transport 
 25 Air transport Air transport 
 26 Other transport Other transport 
 27 Financial services Insurance, financial services nec 
 28 Other private services Communication, business services, recreation and other services 
 29 Government services Public administration and defense, education, health services 
   
Source: GTAP database, version 7.1. 




Table 2: Tariff rates on merchandise imports and tariff equivalents of nontariff barriers on services, 2004 (%) 
Sector
1 Rice 406.1 1.2 424.2 402.0 0.0 17.3 0.0 49.9 26.5 19.3 2.2
2 Other grains 51.8 0.2 4.2 1.5 0.0 1.5 0.0 5.3 27.1 2.7 3.1
3 Sugar 212.5 0.3 4.2 97.9 0.0 34.5 0.0 26.5 19.9 9.1 6.2
4 Other crops 3.6 3.1 69.3 10.0 0.0 1.8 18.3 8.0 22.7 14.3 9.5
5 Livestock 7.0 11.8 5.6 3.0 0.0 2.2 0.5 7.5 4.0 3.4 3.9
6 Fossil fuels 0.0 0.2 4.2 4.9 0.0 0.0 1.8 3.1 0.0 2.2 0.1
7 Natural resources 0.8 0.7 3.3 4.2 0.0 1.8 0.5 2.9 2.7 3.0 6.7
8 Meats 49.9 5.0 31.7 31.5 0.0 2.7 0.7 16.9 38.1 18.6 9.7
9 Dairy products 29.3 8.0 45.8 9.8 0.0 4.0 0.7 3.4 8.2 17.6 7.9
10 Other food products 11.4 6.1 32.2 17.5 0.9 7.7 28.9 5.2 36.1 28.1 19.0
11 Textiles 7.0 9.5 9.4 7.0 0.0 7.8 13.4 6.2 19.7 30.7 10.9
12 Apparel 10.5 10.0 10.3 8.6 0.0 6.4 13.1 11.9 15.6 24.0 16.1
13 Wood and paper 1.0 3.6 3.2 2.4 0.0 3.4 6.4 5.5 15.8 11.2 5.6
14 Petroleum products 2.0 5.4 5.1 4.9 0.0 2.0 6.7 2.4 1.1 14.5 3.2
15 Chemical products 0.9 8.7 6.3 3.1 0.0 4.4 4.2 4.8 11.1 4.6 5.4
16 Metal 0.6 4.7 3.2 2.3 0.0 5.1 6.4 3.9 8.0 4.5 3.7
17 Machinery 0.1 6.5 6.1 2.6 0.0 3.2 4.3 3.0 7.4 6.3 5.9
18 Electronic equipment 0.0 1.7 1.0 0.4 0.0 1.5 1.0 0.2 3.9 7.0 7.2
19 Motor vehicles 0.0 20.1 8.0 31.4 0.0 13.5 47.4 10.4 28.6 33.8 37.9
20 Other transport equip. 0.0 2.9 1.9 2.1 0.0 3.9 3.8 6.4 4.9 12.8 7.8
21 Other manufactures 1.0 6.0 8.0 5.5 0.0 6.6 8.9 6.9 9.1 18.2 8.8
22 Construction and utilities 34.5 55.7 54.3 44.0 0.0 178.8 63.6 138.0 97.3 152.2 66.3
23 Trade 37.9 205.2 58.1 47.6 0.0 185.0 67.5 143.4 110.0 157.9 57.5
24 Sea transport 7.6 29.0 23.4 15.3 0.0 122.6 30.8 90.0 64.0 101.4 5.3
25 Air transport 31.5 109.0 50.8 40.8 0.0 171.8 59.7 132.1 100.3 146.0 49.2
26 Other transport 32.9 134.6 52.4 42.3 0.0 174.7 61.4 134.6 102.4 148.6 22.4
27 Financial services 28.2 138.1 47.8 37.6 0.0 163.5 56.9 127.6 99.2 140.0 30.6
28 Other private services 27.3 128.1 45.6 36.0 0.0 161.0 56.1 124.4 93.0 138.1 11.9
29 Government services 37.9 138.3 58.1 47.6 0.0 185.0 67.5 143.4 110.0 157.9 37.7
Japan China Korea Taiwan Vietnam Rest of
ASEAN






1 Rice 43.8 0.0 0.0 3.3 0.0 0.1 5.2 6.3 8.2 40.0 14.9
2 Other grains 14.8 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 5.5 2.0 11.6 1.1 6.5 14.4
3 Sugar 84.3 0.0 0.0 39.1 0.6 0.0 6.0 9.4 25.8 53.4 13.4
4 Other crops 32.8 0.6 0.0 3.2 0.2 1.5 0.9 9.3 6.2 5.3 11.5
5 Livestock 12.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 14.6 1.2 0.5 9.2 5.6 0.8 5.6
6 Fossil fuels 11.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 2.4 10.5 0.0 0.0 1.4
7 Natural resources 12.4 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 3.5 0.6 6.8 2.3 0.3 2.2
8 Meats 25.9 0.4 0.7 5.5 34.8 1.0 1.3 12.7 15.2 8.3 28.0
9 Dairy products 34.7 3.4 13.6 25.6 106.1 17.1 1.6 18.4 6.8 2.2 13.1
10 Other food products 85.5 1.7 5.1 3.4 9.0 3.9 1.3 6.2 11.2 2.5 16.6
11 Textiles 16.4 12.5 5.1 7.3 5.4 3.3 3.8 14.2 11.0 2.2 12.5
12 Apparel 12.3 16.8 11.1 10.0 11.1 10.9 4.9 18.5 17.6 3.3 12.7
13 Wood and paper 13.2 3.1 1.4 0.2 0.5 1.8 1.0 7.7 10.9 0.1 6.8
14 Petroleum products 11.7 0.0 2.3 1.4 0.7 1.4 1.3 10.7 2.1 0.6 7.9
15 Chemical products 14.3 2.8 1.7 1.4 0.6 2.0 1.6 6.9 9.3 0.4 5.5
16 Metal 15.7 3.1 1.9 1.0 0.4 2.8 1.6 7.6 7.2 0.4 5.5
17 Machinery 14.1 3.3 2.7 1.0 0.4 3.2 1.4 7.4 7.1 0.4 5.9
18 Electronic equipment 2.6 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.0 1.7 2.0 8.0 7.3 0.7 5.2
19 Motor vehicles 24.6 8.4 7.3 1.2 0.9 3.5 2.3 8.9 14.7 1.0 10.1
20 Other transport equip. 10.0 0.8 0.6 0.5 1.1 5.4 0.8 8.5 10.6 0.7 5.2
21 Other manufactures 14.8 3.4 5.1 1.7 0.9 8.1 2.7 9.5 13.5 0.7 7.3
22 Construction and utilities 273.5 33.4 7.6 0.0 25.9 104.6 45.4 82.1 115.5 13.9 69.3
23 Trade 299.2 36.4 9.9 0.0 35.0 110.0 55.6 86.1 130.9 16.0 80.3
24 Sea transport 211.7 6.5 0.0 0.0 5.4 64.0 21.5 45.3 80.3 2.8 27.9
25 Air transport 280.7 30.1 4.9 0.0 28.7 100.3 48.4 77.5 120.2 14.2 82.9
26 Other transport 284.7 31.5 6.0 0.0 30.1 102.4 50.0 79.4 122.6 12.6 63.9
27 Financial services 269.6 27.1 2.7 0.0 26.2 99.1 45.0 75.8 114.8 7.8 69.7
28 Other private services 265.1 26.9 1.5 0.0 24.9 99.6 43.2 70.9 113.3 10.0 63.5
29 Government services 299.2 36.4 9.9 0.0 35.0 110.0 55.6 86.1 130.9 16.8 83.0






Canada Mexico Chile Peru Russia
 
Source: Sectors 1-21: GTAP database, version 7.1. Sectors 22-29: Calculated based on the estimates of tariff equivalents of nontariff barriers on services 
by Wang et al. (2009). 
Table 2 (continued) 
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Table 3: The welfare effects of alternative scenarios 
(Percentage deviations in utility from the baseline) 
2020 2025 2030 2020 2025 2030 2020 2025 2030
Japan 0.4 0.9 1.8 0.9 1.1 1.4 0.8 1.0 1.4
China -0.2 0.5 2.5 3.9 4.2 4.8 3.8 4.0 4.6
Korea 2.8 4.3 7.5 6.0 6.0 6.0 5.7 6.3 6.2
Taiwan -0.1 1.9 6.8 -1.5 -0.2 4.5 -1.1 -2.1 4.3
Singapore 0.1 0.0 0.1 4.0 3.8 3.5 3.8 4.1 3.8
Indonesia -0.1 0.5 3.8 5.0 5.3 6.6 4.8 5.0 6.1
Malaysia 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.9 3.7 4.9 2.6 3.1 4.7
Philippines 0.0 0.3 2.0 2.4 2.0 2.8 2.7 2.1 2.7
Thailand -0.4 0.1 2.3 3.8 4.4 6.1 3.7 4.1 5.9
Vietnam 5.5 5.5 5.6 7.7 9.8 13.5 7.1 8.9 12.7
Rest of ASEAN -0.1 0.1 0.6 1.7 2.5 2.9 1.3 2.0 2.7
India -0.1 -0.4 -0.9 2.5 6.2 8.4 -0.5 4.6 7.6
Australia 0.6 1.1 2.6 1.7 3.9 4.1 0.0 3.4 4.0
New Zealand 0.8 2.1 4.9 0.6 2.8 3.5 -0.5 1.9 3.3
United States 0.2 0.4 0.8 -0.1 0.0 0.6 -0.1 -0.2 0.5
Canada 0.6 1.2 1.8 0.1 0.8 2.2 0.0 0.3 2.0
Mexico 1.1 2.1 2.6 0.1 1.3 3.6 0.1 0.3 3.3
Chile 1.3 2.4 5.3 -0.3 0.5 4.3 -0.3 -0.4 3.8
Peru 0.6 0.9 1.7 0.3 0.7 1.9 0.1 0.3 1.7
Russia -0.1 1.4 6.4 0.4 2.4 7.8 0.2 0.7 6.9
EU-27 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.5 -0.7 -0.2 -0.4 -0.7
Rest of world -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.2 0.5 0.6
Scenario 3 (delayed Asia-track)Scenario 1 (TPP-track) Scenario 2 (Asia-track)
  
Definitions of scenarios: 
Scenario 1 (TPP-track): EU-Korea FTA, Korea-US FTA, and TPP9 over the period 2013-2016, TPP13 over the period 2017-2022, and 
FTAAP over the period 2023-2030. Scenario 2 (Asia-track): EU-Korea FTA, Korea-US FTA, and ASEAN+3 FTA (EAFTA) over the 
period 2013-2016, ASEAN+6 FTA (CEPEA) over the period 2017-2022, and FTAAP over the period 2023-2030. Scenario 3 (delayed 
Asia-track): EU-Korea and Korea-US FTAs over the period 2013-2016, EAFTA over the period 2017-2020, CEPEA over the period 
2021-2025, and FTAAP over the period 2026-2030. 
Source: Model simulations.  
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Table 4: Spearman rank correlation coefficients between sectoral adjustment rankings  
in 2020-2025 and 2025-2030 for each scenario, and those between rankings  
in each scenario and GTL for the year 2030 
 
Between rankings 
in 2020 and 2025
Between rankings 
in 2025 and 2030
Between rankings 
in each scenario 
and GTL, 2030
Scenario 1 (TPP-track)
Japan 0.77 0.84 0.64
China 0.79 0.76 0.87
Korea 0.90 0.91 0.89
Singapore 0.86 0.73 0.66
Indonesia 0.65 0.85 0.95
Malaysia 0.96 0.95 0.84
Philippines 0.44 0.94 0.80
Thailand 0.90 0.83 0.86
Vietnam 0.92 0.95 0.94
 Rest ofASEAN 0.23 0.65 0.37
India 0.23 0.66 0.34
Australia 0.83 0.84 0.73
New Zealand 0.80 0.92 0.86
United States 0.99 0.93 0.72
Canada 0.84 0.51 0.55
Mexico 0.85 0.93 0.71
Chile 0.96 0.98 0.91
Peru 0.96 0.74 0.74
Russia 0.56 0.97 0.85
Scenario 2 (Asia-track)
Japan 0.90 0.97 0.80
China 0.80 0.83 0.93
Korea 0.91 0.97 0.96
Singapore 0.92 0.94 0.56
Indonesia 0.96 0.98 0.98
Malaysia 0.92 0.90 0.85
Philippines 0.88 0.83 0.80
Thailand 0.98 0.91 0.91
Vietnam 0.94 0.93 0.95
 Rest ofASEAN 0.82 0.85 0.69
India 0.80 0.88 0.92
Australia 0.94 0.76 0.88
New Zealand 0.84 0.85 0.90
United States 0.52 0.64 0.80
Canada 0.62 0.80 0.73
Mexico 0.52 0.60 0.73
Chile 0.02 0.77 0.93
Peru 0.82 0.81 0.83
Russia 0.63 0.71 0.85   
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Table 4 (continued) 
 
Between rankings 
in 2020 and 2025
Between rankings 
in 2025 and 2030
Between rankings 
in each scenario 
and GTL, 2030
Scenario 3 (delayed Asia-track)
Japan 0.89 0.94 0.81
China 0.62 0.74 0.91
Korea 0.80 0.94 0.97
Singapore 0.96 0.89 0.55
Indonesia 0.96 0.96 0.98
Malaysia 0.72 0.76 0.83
Philippines 0.91 0.64 0.78
Thailand 0.93 0.87 0.91
Vietnam 0.87 0.88 0.95
 Rest ofASEAN 0.50 0.79 0.70
India - 0.83 0.93
Australia - 0.78 0.86
New Zealand - 0.82 0.92
United States - - 0.81
Canada - - 0.74
Mexico - - 0.75
Chile - - 0.92
Peru - - 0.81
Russia - - 0.82
 
 




Appendix Table: Projected trade shares in the baseline, 2013 (%) 
 
 
                  
Export shares by destination 
                
Exporters China U.S. ASEAN+3 ASEAN+6 TPP 9 TPP 13 FTAAP 
                  
Japan 25.0 12.8 46.6 49.8 21.6 30.9 72.2 
China 8.7 18.4 31.8 35.3 26.5 41.7 58.4 
Korea 36.6 9.9 52.9 55.8 17.5 24.6 70.5 
Taiwan 50.5 9.7 68.6 70.5 17.5 26.3 81.1 
Singapore 23.4 5.9 56.5 62.4 19.7 27.7 67.4 
Indonesia 21.1 6.0 53.6 67.5 20.1 37.6 67.4 
Malaysia 29.6 8.7 58.5 66.3 23.1 34.0 73.9 
Philippines 26.1 10.0 58.9 60.6 24.9 42.7 78.6 
Thailand 26.8 6.8 59.5 63.4 19.6 35.1 70.0 
Vietnam 33.2 9.6 58.9 63.7 19.6 34.5 75.2 
Rest of ASEAN 13.5 11.8 58.8 71.6 23.2 45.0 78.8 
India 15.8 10.2 28.0 29.0 15.7 20.9 42.7 
Australia 24.6 5.4 54.5 65.1 13.8 35.7 68.2 
New Zealand 12.6 10.0 35.0 53.5 31.9 48.3 67.2 
United States 9.3 0.0 25.0 28.4 7.2 37.3 52.1 
Canada 7.1 65.0 12.9 14.1 67.0 71.8 80.7 
Mexico 2.1 70.2 4.1 5.6 71.6 75.3 78.0 
Chile 13.8 11.0 32.0 34.9 16.3 34.7 52.7 
Peru 29.1 13.7 39.0 40.5 22.2 34.0 65.6 
Russia 12.2 4.6 18.2 19.7 6.0 10.2 24.8 
EU-27 4.0 6.6 8.8 11.0 9.4 12.7 20.2 
Rest of world 13.8 10.7 29.0 34.7 15.1 26.6 47.2 






Appendix Table (continued) 
 
 
                  
Import shares by origin 
                
Importers China U.S. ASEAN+3 ASEAN+6 TPP 9 TPP 13 FTAAP 
                  
Japan 23.9 16.4 39.0 44.4 25.9 31.6 65.4 
China 8.7 9.3 43.4 48.4 20.9 43.5 68.6 
Korea 16.7 15.5 42.8 47.1 24.9 41.8 66.9 
Taiwan 14.6 16.5 50.4 53.2 23.1 51.1 72.1 
Singapore 15.4 16.5 43.0 46.3 26.7 38.7 65.7 
Indonesia 20.2 7.1 59.7 66.5 28.0 45.8 72.6 
Malaysia 19.3 12.4 59.8 64.2 27.3 46.6 79.5 
Philippines 21.3 9.5 59.9 63.5 21.4 44.6 79.6 
Thailand 16.7 7.7 55.6 59.1 19.2 44.0 67.0 
Vietnam 31.9 5.0 69.6 73.1 18.0 36.6 83.0 
Rest of ASEAN 25.6 3.4 79.6 83.7 28.0 36.9 86.9 
India 8.5 8.0 26.6 30.6 18.5 25.2 42.3 
Australia 19.0 18.2 44.6 49.6 30.3 43.9 69.6 
New Zealand 12.6 14.0 33.9 55.7 40.2 53.8 71.5 
United States 20.1 0.0 33.8 36.2 3.7 39.2 63.7 
Canada 8.1 68.1 13.1 14.4 69.7 74.8 84.5 
Mexico 9.1 66.3 15.5 16.3 68.3 74.1 85.1 
Chile 9.6 19.3 18.4 20.0 24.0 34.0 46.0 
Peru 8.1 27.4 15.7 17.4 34.2 43.5 54.2 
Russia 9.1 7.6 17.1 18.8 9.4 15.9 26.3 
EU-27 9.2 8.9 15.5 17.3 11.3 16.2 29.7 
Rest of world 9.7 14.6 19.5 23.7 18.0 26.7 42.5 
                  
 
Source: Baseline simulation. 
 
 
